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THE EARLY NUCLEAR AGE
AND VISIONS OF FUTURE WAR
DAVID M. WALKER

The images of a nuclear war bringing the end of the world or something
close to it have been firmly planted in the human imagination since
1945. Fiction and speculative nonfiction writers quickly followed John
Hersey’s factual and journalistic Hiroshima with fantastic imaginings
of nuclear Armageddon, especially once the Cold War began.1 In the
early nuclear age, visions of future wars often fell into the nuclear
holocaust, end-of-the-world genre. Writers imagined future nuclear
war as a no-win exchange of strategic city-busting nuclear weapons.
This tradition continued until the end of the Cold War. There are
well-known works, such as 1963’s Fail-Safe, a novel that speculated
ominously about an accident leading to nuclear war. The book’s preface warns that the “laws of probability assure us that ultimately it will
occur.”2 Many lesser known works proliferated, such as a 1962 edition of Village of Stars with bomber pilots pictured on the cover with
the teaser "could they . . . disarm the deadly nuclear bombs before
it destroyed them all—and triggered World War III.”3 The peak of
warnings about nuclear Armageddon was arguably the 1980s, which
saw continuing literary and motion-picture renderings of nuclear
war as the end of the world. Such works included the widely viewed
1983 ABC television drama The Day After, which simply followed a
tradition that imagined the worst possible outcome should nuclear
weapons ever be used.4 Nuclear energy generation itself eventually
suffered the same fate and became synonymous with a dangerous and
pessimistic future. The end-of-the-world theme dominates our remembrance of the entire nuclear age. However, a reexamination of
the early nuclear age (Hiroshima in 1945 to the Cuban Missile Crisis
in 1962) shows many diverse ideas on the use of nuclear power for
weapons and energy generation.
Often obscured by the more numerous Armageddon themes, the
early nuclear age saw writers who imagined the use of nuclear weapons
and nuclear propulsion on land, sea, and air to be useful, beneficial,

and literally the future of warfare. Their “modern” visions of future war simply sought
the best weapons and energy sources. They saw their use as inevitable and did not
view it pessimistically. That fit into the larger idea that the harnessing of nuclear
energy was a great step forward for the progress of humankind.
These visions of future war from the early nuclear age that viewed the use of nuclear
weapons as useful and desirable, or at least inevitable, can be broken down into several categories—professional military writing, military contractor advertisements, and
fiction in comic books and novels. First and foremost, and the category most often
overlooked, are the professional military writers. These were officers, academics, and
other government officials who discussed and sought and succeeded in actually implementing new doctrine and tactics during the 1950s for a future war using nuclear
energy for battlefield weapons and propulsion. They wrote in service journals such as
Armor, Ordnance, and the Marine Corps Gazette and published book-length works.
During the early nuclear age, the U.S. armed forces effectively “nuclearized” their
forces. Most often associated with that process was the buildup of the strategic deterrent force of long-range heavy bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
and, later, Polaris missile submarines. The U.S. armed forces built a tremendously
strong strategic deterrent nuclear force, one that helps bring about the end of the
world in much literature on future war. Though advocates of a strategic nuclear deterrent force with large multi-megaton warheads were successful in building up those
forces, the weapons were not meant to be used. Ideally, a deterrent force will never
be used. If deterrence failed, the Armageddon scenarios depicted in much literature
would not have been off the mark. However, nuclearization affected all levels of the
armed forces, including ground and amphibious forces and tactical air power. It was
a major innovation affecting issues of training, doctrine, and tactics for combat on
the traditional battlefield.
While the great power of strategic nuclear weapons led the Eisenhower administration to fully embrace the idea of “massive retaliation” under its New Look review
of defense policy, the Pentagon cleared the way for the comprehensive development
of tactical atomic weapons and organization for battlefield nuclear war. It is here that
certain visions of future nuclear war have been lost. These were optimistic visions of
usable weapons—small tactical devices—for employment in traditional conceivable
battlefield environments. In addition, nuclear energy would provide propulsion for
weapons and vehicles. Used for such purposes, nuclear energy could win small wars
and even large-scale battlefield wars between NATO and the Warsaw Pact without
bringing an end to human existence.
At the highest levels of security decision making, the Eisenhower administration encouraged the creation of that atmosphere, but initial ideas for using atomic
weapons in a tactical battlefield role can be traced to the U.S. Army’s chief of staff,
George C. Marshall. Prior to the end of World War II he suggested the possibility

of employing the atomic bomb in support of the planned November 1945 invasion
ofJapan. Adm. Richard Connally, who had been planning for air and naval gunfire
support in the upcoming invasion, requested that he get six bombs in direct support of the beachheads. However, planning for the strategic use of the bomb overshadowed Marshall’s suggestion and Connally’s request.5
After the start of the Korean War in June 1950, the Defense Department looked at
the problems of tactical air support and the feasibility of nuclear weapons use in the
tactical role. The Pentagon study came to be known as the Vista Project, and it recommended the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the NATO area because their use
might prove decisive. The study suggested fielding tactical atomic weapon systems
that could destroy targets in any weather by accurately hitting them with one- to
fifty-kiloton weapons at a distance of twenty to twenty-five miles from the front.6
The army contemplated atomic warheads small enough to allow development of
atomic artillery shells and to arm close-air support with atomic weapons. A battlefield commander could use a tactical nuclear weapon to destroy an entire enemy company or battalion and blast his way through a major defensive system, opening the
ground battle to armored exploitation. Even the heaviest defensive belts, such as the
Hindenburg line in World War I or Hitler’s Atlantic Wall, could be breached quickly
without the vast expenditure of lives and conventional munitions. Tactical nuclear
weapons for the battlefield appeared to offer great results.
Top officials in the military and civilian bureaucracies and mid- and low-level officers writing in service journals illustrated an acceptance of the future atomic battlefield as a reality. That resulted in a great effort to implement reorganization, conduct
field maneuvers, develop new doctrine, and acquire new technology for creating an
atomic field army for future war.
A history of the U.S. Army published in 1956 referred to the army of the 1950s as
being “in a state of healthy flux as it shifts and regroups its fire power in preparation
and training for the ultimate mission, if called upon.” The army of 1956 “must face
the present order to be prepared for the future.” The writer implied that the 1956 army
was “modern” and drew a direct line of advancement from early Krupp field pieces
to the venerable French “75” of World War I to guided missiles and “the monstrous
280-mm 'atomic cannon.”7
The author reflected the U.S. Army idea that the 1956 army was modern in weapons
and in doctrine as well. The most important new modern technologies were nuclear
weapons and nuclear propulsion. Tie implications of atomic weapons for the battlefield drove technology in other areas, such as the aircraft needed for mobility on the
atomic battlefield and fully enclosed armored vehicles. As atomic weapons became
progressively physically smaller in size, opportunities abounded.
In 1953 Eisenhower's new army chief of staff, Gen. Mathew Ridgway, began to
heavily focus army thinking on nuclear weapons." So enthusiastic was he that he said

the “increase in firepower will be tremendous, the effect on tactics evolutionary."9
Ridgway extolled the idea of atomic artillery and rockets in the hands of the troops.
He viewed modern striking power as necessary for a modern army.10
By the fall of 1954 the army had proposed a new concept called the atomic field
army, or ATFA.11 The army participated in several exercises held during 1954 and 1955,
including Follow Me, Bluebolt, and Hailstorm, testing atomic defense organization,
doctrine, and techniques for the battlefield. Several army exercises in the Desert
Rock series at the Nevada nuclear test grounds involved military personnel deployed
on occasion as close as two thousand yards from an atomic blast. At varying distances
of two thousand to seven thousand yards, troops sheltering in trenches emerged to
conduct maneuvers. Armored vehicles and transport helicopters ventured close to
ground zero.12
Ridgway wrote, “In broad terms the Army must be a streamlined, hard-hitting
force.” His optimistic vision of the future army saw the capability to airlift “whole
armies, armed with nuclear weapons, and put them down upon any spot on the earth’s
surface.”13
After Ridgway retired, his successor, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, continued the testing
of the atomic army. Under Taylor, the army eventually implemented full-scale reorganization into an atomic-equipped force. He presided over Sagebrush—a massive
joint army-air force simulated atomic exercise in Louisiana during the fall of 1955.14
At a press conference in January 1956, General Taylor outlined his vision for an
atomic future. He talked of future wars and noted that “the Army has reached the
point where it knows pretty well what its organizations should be for the possibilities of atomic war.”15 The army of the future, Taylor said, must have more low-yield
atomic warheads. He regarded as “essential” the procurement of such weapons. He
wanted the United States to maintain its advantage in delivering “atomic fires”—an
artillery term revealing again how the army thought about nuclear war.16
The final product of the reorganization and testing was the pentomic army. The
Reorganization of the Airborne Division (ROTAD) saw the 101st Airborne begin
the first pentomic reorganization in September 1956. The army followed that with
Reorganization of the Current Infantry Division (ROCID) and Reorganization of
the Current Armored Division (ROCAD). In the ROTAD and ROCID, the army
eliminated the regiment and battalion echelons and combined them into five (hence
“pentomic”) semi-independent battle groups of five companies each. Hereafter the
army referred to all of the divisions as “pentomic” divisions. By mid-1958 the army had
reorganized all active divisions—fifteen at that time—and all reserves and National
Guard divisions by the end of i960.17
The army characterized the reorganization enthusiastically as “effecting the most
revolutionary changes in warfare tactics in modern history.” The new divisions, along
with new nondivisional missile commands, would allow for atomic missile and artil-

lery strikes deep into enemy-held territory, followed by a massing of troops in armor
and helicopters to exploit the holes in the enemy lines. They would then disperse again
to avoid enemy counter-atomic fire. The army proclaimed that the new pentomic divisions were “fashioned around the concept of future warfare when the range and power
of missiles will make the age-old lineal array of opposing armies impracticable and
suicidal.”18 It is apparent that the army did not view the atomic battlefield—officially
at least—as a suicidal no-win scenario.
Secretary of the Army William Brucker, with an apparent sense of awe, stated that
the army’s four corporal missile battalions in Europe possessed more firepower than
all of the U.S. artillery in World War II.19 In the army’s semiannual report he proudly
wrote of nuclear weapons that gave the army the “greatest firepower in history.”20
The army’s top leadership clearly favored the dual-capable army, and especially its
atomic capabilities. The belief in the likelihood of a future atomic battlefield, and the
doctrine, tactics, and capabilities of the atomic age army, also existed widely at lower
levels. Visions of future war in the service journals are illustrative of a forgotten time.
For example, the journal Military Review had six articles under the entry “atomic
warfare” in the yearly index for the 1952-53 publication year. By 1958 the total was
twenty-eight. Most of the articles dealt with employment of tactical atomic weapons
by the army.21 Such articles suggest that a large number of officers who would command companies, battle groups, and divisions believed that the atomic-equipped
army represented the future of warfare. The architects of the pentomic army and
those officers who trained for battlefield nuclear war believed in the utility of nuclear
weapons on the battlefield and a future where a nuclear battlefield was a real prospect
that would not result in the end of the world.22
Contributors submitted articles ranging from squad tactics to division tactics
and beyond. Reflecting the tenor of the period, army officers offered all kinds of
optimistic suggestions. In an article for Army Combat Forces Journal, Col. George B.
Sloan offered his “Design for an Atomic Army.” He advocated a highly mobile airtransportable army that depended on “tactical atomic weapons for area saturation
fires with the elimination of the bulk of conventional artillery.”23 Colonel Unitas—a
pseudonym for “unite us”—wrote in “Battle Future of Our Army,” wrote that the
army must be prepared for an atomic war and have forces that were “self sufficient
with great staying and recuperative power.” He held that such power must derive
from high mobility and be “hard hitting.”24 Lt. Col. H. A. De Weerd believed in
the “shock power” of atomic weapons in his article “Time of Atomic Plenty.” He
saw free-flowing, highly mobile battles reminiscent of the Afrika Korps battles in a
Western Desert-type campaign, with atomic weapons actually in the hands of the
troops.25
At the small unit level, Col. George Dickerson discussed tactics in “Squads in
Atomic Battle: The Training of the Pentomic Squad."26 Col. Henry E. Kelly wrote

on squad doctrine in “Dig that Atomic Foxhole,” arguing that foxhole designs had
become much more important under atomic conditions. Radiation and heat effects
required full cover and concealment that nevertheless could be obtained with the
right modern technology.27
Battalion-level tactics were most prevalent in the literature. Col. Frank Sackton
argued in “Atomic Weapons for the Battalion Commander” that there were multiple possible uses for “baby bombs.” He especially thought bridges could be most
effectively hit by small-yield atomic weapons. He imagined atomic weapons fired
from mortars, hand-operated rocket launchers, recoilless guns, and deployed as land
mines. The Davy Crockett weapon system did become a reality by i960, as well as the
man-portable atomic demolition munition, which was physically only slightly larger
than a World War II antitank mine.28
Col. Edward Rowney, in “Ground Tactics in an Atomic War,” discussed various
methods of attack and defense in atomic war. Attack involved various uses of atomic
fire on enemy forward or rear positions, or both, followed by an exploitation maneuver.29 Maj. Gen. Joseph Harper and Col. Joseph Stillwell Jr., in the article "The Final
Decision is the Infantryman’s,” argued that future battlefields will see infantry units
down to the battalion controlling atomic weapons.30
In “Atomic Weapons in Close Support,” Col. Dallas Pilliod discussed divisionlevel tactics. He pondered whether it would be prudent to withdraw forward forces to
minimize their exposure during an atomic attack on the enemies line. What would
the enemy do if their patrols sensed a withdrawal and began to suspect an atomic
attack? He concluded that the best course was to withdraw, believing the enemy
could not react in time. Then the preliminary bombardment could “hit the enemy
on the nose with atomic weapons.”31 Lt. Col. Raymond Millican discussed divisionand corps-level tactics in “Divide and Conquer.” He used the example of U.S. forces
on the defensive against large enemy concentrations and argued that mobile units
should fall back and draw the enemy on where “conventional and atomic weapons
blast the enemy column.”
In the realm of artillery, the army viewed atomic weapons and their delivery systems, whether missiles or guns, as simply artillery. Atomic detonations were simply
atomic “fires” on the enemy. Capt. Josiah A. Wallace Jr., in “Extending the Range,”
talked about how “guided missiles and rockets are giving surface-to-ground artilleries
more punch, and more range, which means more mobility.”32 New army missiles such
as the Corporal had the “demolition effect of hundreds of artillery shells.”33 Maj. Gen.
Edward T. Williams, in “Effective Artillery Support Isn’t Accidental,” wrote that
the Artillery and Guided Missile School was “aggressively studying and developing
doctrine, tactics, technique, and new weapons in light of atomic warfare.” He specifically praised atomic artillery and guided missiles in supporting “atomic-age infantry”
and saw missiles rockets and atomic cannons as “an integral and very important part

of our family of surface-to-surface weapons."34 In “Choose Your Atomic Weapons,”
Major Duelo—a pseudonym—suggested an important new piece of equipment for
the troops: “the soldier’s handy atomic weapons selector.”35 Tie “Artomic” (artillery
plus atomic) platoon was the idea ofCapt. Julius Spitzberg. He proposed breaking up
traditional artillery batteries into two platoons to allow for more dispersal but also
better control. His detailed organizational description of the platoon centered on the
new eight-inch atomic-capable and self-propelled howitzer batteries.36
Armor advocates saw the tank as most adaptable to the nuclear battlefield, hoping to see armored forces become the primary arm of atomic age combat. Dramatic
drawings sometimes accompanied articles, such as an Armor article that featured a
drawing of a mushroom cloud and the title “Armor Past Present and Future.”37 Capt.
George S. Patton offered a unique historical perspective. His article, “Operation
Crusader,” attempted to show that a 1941 battle in the Western Desert could be used
as an example of what is possible for armored forces in an atomic war. Tie mobile
operations of the Afrika Korps surely inspired him to envision a wide-ranging battle
with armor concentrating and dispersing.38
Capt. Patrick W. Powers wrote a series of articles titled “The Pentomic Army’s
Missile Power.” He believed the army needed “the firepower of a family of mean,
mobile, and destruction packed rockets and guided missiles.”39
During the fall of 1956, when the 101st Airborne became the first division to participate in the pentomic reorganization, the journal Army commented that there was
among the soldiers of the 101st “an infectious enthusiasm and optimism displayed
by all hands.”40 Capt. Thomas M. Waitt argued in “Deep Thrust with a One-Two
Punch—That’s the Atomic Airborne Team” that airborne forces and atomic weapons
were a powerful combination. He suggested that airborne forces could best exploit
atomic strikes. His enthusiasm for jumping near ground zero was undaunted, for he
had done so himselfat Camp Desert Rock in Nevada, one thousand yards from ground
zero, ninety minutes after the detonation with the mushroom cloud still visible.41
The Pentagon deemed the possibility of exposing soldiers and marines to low
levels of radiation during the Desert Rock exercises in Nevada as an acceptable risk.
The maneuvers testing battlefield nuclear war doctrine had to be realistic, and planners needed to know how soldiers and marines would perform after experiencing a
nuclear detonation up close. Scientists observed personnel during the exercises and
collected psychological data. Soldiers and marines wore film badges that measured
some types of radiation and trained monitors accompanied the troops. Evidence later
showed that low-level radiation posed serious health risks not fully comprehended by
many senior officials.42
Along with brief articles, some army officers offered serious book-length treatments that went into great detail on atomic battlefield tactics. An important early
work on atomic age battlefield tactics was Atomic Weapons in Land Combat by Col.

G. C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner, both of the U.S. Army.43 The authors
stated that “the play of atomic weapons features [in] every major maneuver and command post exercise” and that the army had begun to integrate aspects of atomic-war
fighting into all training.44 They stressed that the army considered atomic weapons a
“sledgehammer" advantage and the “main source of shock power.”45 Their argument
rested on the belief that atomic weapons were becoming “conventional,” the mainstay
weapon of choice on the battlefield, not just “occasionally employed.”46
Another detailed book on atomic war was Nuclear Tactics, Weapons and Firepower
in the Pentomic Division, Battlegroup and Company, by the army’s Col. Theodore C.
Metaxis and Lt. Col. Seymour L. Goldberg. They believed that tactics for atomic war
must encompass “the entire army right down to the squad.”47 Their study was a comprehensive and serious attempt to show that battlefield nuclear-war fighting was possible and had become and should continue to be the central focus of army planning.
A better known army persona, Lt. General James Gavin, also published a book
in 1958 that advocated, almost radically we might say, atomic weapons for the army.
Gavin evoked almost unbounded enthusiasm for the new doctrine and vision of
future war. He imagined army “hyper-mobile” forces equipped with tactical nuclear
weapons ranging from a “shoulder fired infantryman’s weapon” to “long-range missiles." Gavin believed missiles to be simply “modern” artillery, and tactical nuclear
weapons to be simply “modern” conventional explosives. His faith in the utility of
small-yield tactical atomic weapons was especially strong, but in the end he represented a wider view within the entire army.48
Thus by the late 1950s the U.S. Army had reorganized its structure, constructed
a doctrine, and discussed and practiced tactics for battlefield atomic war. The belief
in the utility of low-yield atomic weapons for tactical use was well entrenched. The
effects of the pentomic concept were felt from the rifle squad to the field army. Whatever the amount of criticism later leveled on the pentomic army in hindsight, at the
time, during the early nuclear age, the idea of battlefield atomic war was the future of
war. It was a future not based on deterrence but on use of the most modern effective
weapons. The army did not believe that atomic weapons changed the need for field
forces composed of individual rifleman but simply added atomic weapons to the
realm of artillery. Army leaders adjusted their organization, doctrine, and tactics for
combat on an atomic battlefield, but a battlefield it remained. That was the emerging
picture of army innovation in the 1950s, and its actual capability and mindset to fight
a battlefield war in the “age of A-bomb soldiers.”49
The U.S. Army required close-air support form the U.S. Air Force, which innovated in the only way it appeared to know how, by preparing to provide tactical nuclear support of the army. They conducted realistic training during atomic tests
sending both drones and manned aircraft through the mushroom clouds. Air Force
innovation resulted in the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF). Nicknamed “Double

Trouble,” for its dual capability for atomic and conventional ordnance, the CASF
was a force of fighter-bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, tankers, and transports that
could move from centrally located positions in the United States to anywhere in the
world and conduct operations within ninety-six hours of an alert. Planning revolved
around likely operations in Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East and
“show of force” operations in Central and South America.
The CASF was small, but in the words of a commanding officer of Tactical Air
Command, the unit could “achieve decisive results with less time than is inherent in
the large scale employment of conventional weapons.” Mobility and firepower were
the key to the CASF, just as in army planning. The air force was proud of an exercise
it engaged in during the spring of 1957 in which F-100 Super Sabres flew nonstop
with aerial tanker support to Panama from bases in Texas in order to deliver simulated atomic weapons in support of ground forces.50 Clearly the air force emphasized
the atomic firepower of the CASF. It was more modern and effective. The air force
also experimented with aircraft nuclear propulsion, though with little success.
The U.S. Navy embraced the atomic age with as much vigor as the other services.
To support the army and marine ground forces, it deployed atomic-capable naval and
marine aircraft and the new jet-capable carriers on which to park them. The navy
also developed a tactical nuclear artillery round for shore bombardment from the
sixteen-inch main guns of Iowa-class battleships and found nuclear propulsion in
many classes of vessels to be very effective.
In the U.S. Navy publication Atomic Warfare Defense, published by the Bureau
of Naval Personnel in 1955, the navy declared, “Any future war will likely see the
use of atomic bombs, atomic artillery, torpedoes, and guided missiles with atomic
warheads, and perhaps other munitions using atomic or thermonuclear explosions.”51
Secretary of the Navy Charles S. Thomas stated in laudatory tones that “further
progress was made in the Navy’s gradual transition from steam to nuclear power,
from guns to guided missiles, from TNT to atomic weapons, and from propeller to
jet aircraft."52

In the late 1950s the navy reflected its continued embrace of nuclear power in its
semiannual report under the section “Air Strike Capability” by listing its nuclear
capabilities, such as the dual-capable heavy- and light-attack aircraft, the atomicarmed Regulus 1 cruise missiles, the Bullpup atomic-armed air-to-surface missile,
and the Polaris missile.53 One could only conclude from the report that naval “Air
Strike Capability” meant nuclear capability. Moreover, tactical nuclear weapons assumed a growing role among all capabilities. The navy also was well on its way
toward achieving its vision of an all-nuclear-propelled task force of carriers, cruisers,
frigates, and submarines.
Vice-Admiral W. V. Davis, in a 1958 article titled “The Navy in Limited War,”
stated that the navy had developed “versatile carrier striking forces” that could deliver

“a full family of weapons.” He acknowledged that the service had spent much effort
on nuclear capabilities but insisted that it had maintained a dual capability.54 However,
though stressing the dual capability of their carrier air, the navy kept stressing the
nuclear part ofthat capability, and of the nuclear strength of the navy in general.
In “Nuclear Energy and Sea Power,” the navy’s Lt. George P Steele proclaimed a
new era of nuclear sea power that was as revolutionary as the advent of steam power
tor navies. Steele imagined faster ships that rarely had to refuel and he proudly wrote
that, already in 1953, navy officers received instruction in “things nuclear.”55
The Marine Corps’ Col. R. T. Vance, with a vested interest in U.S. Navy transport,
advocated nuclear-powered transport as the future. He speculated about fast nuclear
amphibious ships. “We could have all the present types, in a new flashy atomic style,"
he suggested. He believed LSTs (landing ship tank) would be best though, along
with a nuclear-powered navy floatplane with a tremendous cargo capacity. Vance
even imagined large nuclear-powered land cargo hauler for deserts and such.56
In a Marine Corps Gazette article, Lt. Col. L. E. Hudgin related his findings at
the Nevada nuclear test site. He described in detail how a blast seemed to a marine in
a trench four thousand yards from ground zero. Soon after H-hour, marine helicopters arrived and transported the infantry two thousand yards closer to ground zero.
Hudgins was very optimistic about the whole enterprise and declared the evolving
marine doctrine for battlefield nuclear war as “sound.” Marines could “move out
immediately after the blast" and were protected well by the trenches.57
Like the U.S. Army, the Marines Corps reorganized it divisions for more mobility and procured its own atomic weapons delivery capability. Brig. Gen. Richard C.
Magium, in his article “The Marines Are Ready,” argued thatatomic weapons could
“compressdays of preliminary bombardment into a few minutes of time.” He thought
that the Honest John and the future Lacrosse missile—both atomic capable—could
replace conventional artillery.58
The U.S. armed forces nuclearized during the Eisenhower New Look era, and the
enthusiasm with which they did so is evident from the writings of numerous professional military officers and civilian policy makers who wrote in service journals and
governmental reports. They saw nuclear weapons and propulsion as “modern" and
believed in the tremendous advantage those weapons and, one day, propulsion could
give to a battlefield environment. They saw nuclear weapons as having utility not
simply for deterrence but for use at the tactical level. Use at the tactical level need not
lead to Armageddon. Their view of battlefield nuclear war was at its heart optimistic
about the use of nuclear weapons and energy for future war.
Another optimistic view of the nuclear battlefield of the future can be seen in
advertisements in several of these service journals that gave dramatic depictions of
future nuclear battlefields. Included in the service journals, the defense contractors
offer another angle supporting and reflecting the military and academic writers. What

is important is that the advertisers visually imagined a possible future nuclear war in
a very positive and workable sense.

As a major defense contractor in the 1950s, ARMA Corporation dealt with guidance and navigation systems. Better known for their work on ICBMs, ARMA
researched and developed navigation systems for armored vehicles and advertised
their work in several periodicals. Along with commentary, ARMA advertisements
often included painted renderings of future battlefield environments. In one Air Force
magazine ad we can see an imaginary next generation heavy tank—there was nothing like it at the time—buttoned up and rolling across a battlefield of the future. The
sky is a dark red, and in the background is the rising mushroom cloud of a small
tactical nuclear detonation. The tank is firing its gun on the move, and the text below

In a landscape swept barren b y atom ic explosions, w ith one visible in the r ig h t- h and corner, a

1952 advertisem ent for the defense contractor A R M A conjures up a tough image o f fu tu re war.
Yet a U.S. ta n k u tiliz in g A R M A land navigation te ch n o lo g y moves th ro u g h the danger to w in

the fig h t. A R M A C orp ora tio n advertisem ent

is about using ARMA technology for blind navigation. The nuclear battlefield imagined by the pentomic planners would indeed be dispersed and mobile and ARMA
imagined what it might look like.59
The Douglas Corporation produced drawings bringing to life a future nuclearwar
that imagined infantry calling for atomic strikes. Carried in an advertisement for
Ordnance magazine, the page had a drawing of the Honest John ready to be fired
from the modified bed of a traditional six-wheeled army truck with soldiers crouching
nearby. One of the soldiers is looking through binoculars at the enemy positions. The
artist clearly meant to imply a battlefield similar to World War II with olive drab-clad
U.S. soldiers at the front. The only exception is that the artillery being called upon
by the soldier with the binoculars has a tactical atomic warhead. The caption in part
reads, “So powerful that it revises infantry strategy, the Douglas Honest John is an
artillery rocket of tremendous destructive force and deadly accuracy.” After reminding the reader the Honest John could carry an atomic warhead, the reader is told the
rocket is a mobile weapon system “up front with the infantry.” The imagery evokes
a clear sense that a future nuclear war will be “Normandy" with atomic artillery fire
called in from time to time. These are not images of the end of the world.60
Several professional military writers moved more into the realm of speculation
about future nuclear war, but there is a difference between speculative nonfiction
and science fiction. These writers tried to see beyond what could be clearly seen and
were serious attempts to chart the long-term direction of future development efforts.
Lt. Col. Robert Rigg, for example, wrote an entire fictional account of a war in 1974,
aptly titled War 1974, based on articles he had published in several different service
journals through the 1950s. Rigg believed his ideas on future war were “not science
fiction” or “casual fantasy.” Rigg was probably the most prolific military author with
this type of writing.
In a 1956 article “Soldier of the Future Army,” Rigg wrote about atomic-powered
aircraft carrying “land spacemen,” who deployed from the aircraft on flying platforms
like some sort of aerial landing craft. Such "3D” warfare even included flying tanks.
Soldiers were equipped with visored helmets that had built-in radio and night vision.
An aerial field army would conduct a three-dimensional blitzkrieg supplied by giant
atomic-powered helicopters. Rigg wrote several more articles leading up to his book
on different aspects of future war. In “Airborne Warriors Look to the Future,” he
described the army airborne units of the future as using aerial jeeps, drone reconnaissance helicopters with television cameras, and “rotochute canisters” delivering supplies. In an article on logistics he described freight missiles lobbed deep into enemy
territory to resupply long-range assault forces.
In his War 1974, Rigg imagined a future war that saw“ghost groups"—highly mobile and dispersed assault forces—operating deep in enemy territory. Aerial assaults
by commandos attacked ICBM complexes before the enemy had a chance to fire

them. All manner of equipment could be air transported, or fly itself, and often it
was atomic powered. That was warfare in what he named the “Megaton Age.” He
also referred to the year 1974 as year 29 AE (of the atomic era).61
Rigg is worth exploring because of the surety of his vision of war, which he developed during the early nuclear age. In his words, it simply is “an indication of a military technique to come.”62 In his hypothetical war, Rigg wrote of nuclear-powered
transport aircraft that carried 170 men and 120 small assault craft. The “aerocopters”
were assault transports carried by the larger nuclear plane and would carry fifteen
soldiers.63 Much of Rigg's vision revolved around nuclear energy for propulsion, and
after he finished his fictional story he added chapters detailing current research. He
enthusiatically wrote of it being five or ten years “until nuclear-powered aircraft and
helicopters race through the skies.” Though he did admit seeing atomic powered
tanks as a little farther off.64
Rigg speculated that such nuclear conveyances, because of their range, could transport U.S soldiers—infantryman—to far-off battles and would replace the need for
strategic thermonuclear strikes to take out enemy ICBM complexes and other such
targets Nuclear propulsion would allow for World War II-type battles far into the
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future. It would prevent the end of the world and keep the infantryman at the forefront of warfare in the nuclear age.
Others speculated along the same lines but included more usable tactical nuclear
firepower. Battles wouldhave all kinds of advanced equipment, often atomic-powered,
too, and with atomic warheads, but they nonetheless would be battles on the ground
between soldiers. One officer wrote about infantry “shoulder weapons” that had
the effect of “thunderbolts of atomic firepower.”65 In an article titled “Armor of the
Future,” the writer saw atomic battlefields of the future that might have atomicpowered tanks with thousand-mile ranges.66
In imagining a bright nuclear future, the U.S. Navy’s Capt. Walter Karig in War in
the Atomic Age proclaimed, “The Atomic Age is here” and “the world is at the threshold of a new era and the United States is, for the time being at least, at the head of
a procession waiting to enter the magic country.” For Karig the “the magic country”
included fantastic new weapons and military propulsion systems thatwould transform
warfare. Writing from the vantage point of 1946, he envisioned a future war of 1976.
The advertising blurb before the title page promises that Karig’s work of fiction is an
account of a future war that could happen unless the world takes a “sane and sensible
road out of the present international misunderstandings.” However, the book is not
really in the genre of Armageddon nuclear fiction. It appears the publisher thought
so, and that the reviewer did not actually read the book. The “one week war” of 1976 is
indeed destructive, but it was not Armageddon. On the contrary, Karig’s enthusiasm
for the wonders of the atomic age are found throughout.
In his war between the fictitious totalitarian “Galaxy” alliance and the “free” United
States of America, he did start off with an atomic “autobomb” attack on Kansas City,
similar to that in The Day After movie. However, the similarity ends quickly, along
with the war—it only lasts one week. Superior atomic propulsion technology, such
as atomic-powered ships and submarines, as well as aircraft, overwhelm the enemy.
His atomic submarines travel at one hundred knots. Mitigating large atomic attacks
on cities is an antiballistic missile (ABM) energy barrier powered by atomic energy.
Should large nuclear detonations occur, he postulated that the U.S. Army could
quickly decontaminate a twelve-mile-high mushroom cloud before it drifted downwind to other locales, thereby making an atomic blast less lethal. Anti-ship missiles
called atomic dronehydrofoils had atomic thrusters, yet in referring to the them, Karig
simply stated that they were “just atom-powered, like most ships and aircraft.”67
At the end, in a clearly laudatory fashion imbued with wonderment, Karig explained
to the reader how nuclear fission worked. There were no lamentations or predictions
that the world would come to an end if atomic energy was pursued for military uses.
Atomic “autobombs” were technically outlawed in his world of 1976, but they were
used anyway and their effects were far from disastrous because of atomic-powered
defenses and advanced decontamination techniques. It is hard to place Karig’s book

into the end-of-the-world genre of nuclear fiction or as a pessimistic vision. He imagined a future nuclear war that appeared workable and feasible.
In the nonmilitary and nonacademic world of popular culture, images of future
nuclear war most clearly resembled end-of-the-world themes. Any nuclear war meant
the end of civilization. The message, of course, was that contemplating nuclear war,
and by this they always assumed nuclear war in the future to be strategic thermonuclear war, was in itself insane and morally wrong. In the end, nuclear energy itself
became suspect. However, not all popular culture could be counted on to relay that
message. Comic books from the 1950s offer a unique, very colorful look at that culture along with some memorable dialogue that evokes the era.
“Fire point blank—range zero! Load atomic shells! Nothin’ else’ll hold 'em off.”
That line is from a 1952 edition of the comic book Atomic War. The story in that issue
viewed a future world war as a World War II—like affair, with troops, tanks, artillery, and machine guns, except that it added atomic weapons. At a different point
in the story, after U.S. forces had lured the “Reds” into a valley, one GI explained
to another, “The Reds’re trapped like rats! That’s our atomic artillery finishing the
job.” The cover had a U.S. fighter-bomber jet about to sink a Soviet submarine and
the pilot exclaiming, “Even a near miss will get that Red sub when I fire my atomic
rockets!”68
Another comic book from the same period, Atom Age Combat, showed a similar
picture of future war. It featured atomic artillery, atomic mortars, atomic machine
guns, atomic hand grenades and the like. The imagined future war depicted great
battles akin to World War II’s Battle of the Bulge, except that the soldiers had free
and unfettered access to a cornucopia of atomic-based weapons. The enemy Reds
were often depicted in this comic and others as grim caricatures of masses of Asianlike hordes. These were stories of the Cold War going hot but were certainly not
implying that East fighting West with nuclear weapons meant the end of the world.
One issue of Atom Age Combat depicted Navy Seal-type frogmen on the cover in a
spectacular scene that showed several of the commandos running up onto a beach
in their scuba gear into the face of enemy machine guns while just off shore several
atomic explosions are visible. Inside the issue, one of the frogmen reports, “This is
Rough! Guided missiles with atomic warheads have struck our69
sub!" Atom Age Combat often had splashy covers that did not show any mushroom clouds at all. They
looked just like any comic about World War II with traditional-looking GIs on the
battlefield. In one issue they are manhandling an antiaircraft gun, and in another
soldiers are charging a machine gun nest crewed by a yellow-faced soldier with a red
star on an armband.70 Yet it is still “Atom Age Combat.”
Yet another publisher ventured into the comic-book future-war venue with Atomic
Attack. One issue had more grim-looking Communists running away from a U.S.
fighter bomber jet strafing them with rockets while in the background a mushroom
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cloud looms. A blurb on the cover reads, “I’ll fight in tomorrow’s war.” That sounds
very optimistic, but after all, who would not want to fight in such modern, wellequipped armed forces?
One of the stories from that issue of Atomic Attack takes place in a future war in
1972 and starts oft with a soldier writing home to his younger brother about a recent
adventure. His commando team was ordered to destroy a Communist nuclear facility
located in a fortress city. U.S. “atomic artillery” and “atomic rifle units” could not
break through the defenses outright, so the army developed a stealth plan. The commandos sneaked in and set explosive charges that succeeded in destroying the target,
but not before they had a close call escaping through a tunnel where Communists
appeared to have them trapped. Faced with that crisis, one team member shouts
the warning, “No atomic bullets” because they would be killed if they used them in
the confined space of the tunnel. Another story in the same issue is about fighting
Germans in World War II.71 As with other comics of the genre, Atomic Attack had
issues where there was no indication on the cover of an atomic war. The images
looked more like they were from a cover of Sgt Rock.72 The comic stories drift back
and forth between World War II combat and future combat, which looks similar
except for the occasional use of atomic weapons in the hands of the troops. The message is clear: Whether it is World War II or a future war with nuclear weapons, there
is little difference for the GI, and since U.S. forces achieved victory on the battlefield
against the Germans in World War II, they would achieve victory on the nuclear
battlefield against the Communists.
Outside the comic book world, science fiction often portrayed end-of-the-world
themes due to nuclear war. Walter Miller’s 1959 novel A Canticle for Leibowitz is a
prime example. In it, humans destroyed civilization once with nuclear arms then
forgot they did so and built a new civilization that eventually developed nuclear
power and therefore promptly destroyed itself again.73 However, not all stories were
like that, as this dialogue from another 1959 book illustrates: “Then my first rocket
hit—that unmistakable (if you’ve never seen one) brilliance of an atomic explosion.
It was just a peewee, of course, less than two kilotons nominal yield.” The character
is fighting in a far-off future war on another planet, but he is still an infantryman
carrying small, portable tactical nuclear weapons. The mobile infantryman are from
science fiction author Robert Heinlein’s Starship Troopers. It is no coincidence that
Heinlein wrote the book in the 1950s, when the real U.S. Army planned to fight on
the battlefield of the future with atomic weapons in the hands of ordinary soldiers.
Heinlein’s vision of where nuclear technology would take military power was similar
to that of the Pentagon. For Heinlein, twenty-third-century society required soldiers
to apply “controlled and purposeful violence” in such a way as to achieve a specific
goal. Devastating a city with a thermonuclear bomb does not always make sense and
could be akin to “spanking a baby with an axe.” The mobile infantryman are taught

to “make war as personal as a punch in the nose. We can be selective.” The pentomic
division made selective firepower its hallmark. Dual capability allowed for firepower
up and down the range of need, and all of it far below the thermonuclear threshold
and therefore short of causing the end of the world.74
Remembrance of the early nuclear age has suffered. The U.S. Army's pentomic
experience ended in the 1960s as a new administration and the Pentagon developed
yet a different vision of future battlefield war and tested it in South Vietnam. The lasting legacies of the early vision of battlefield nuclear war were the latent effects of the
exposure to low-level radiation of at least two hundred thousand military and civilian
personnel at test sites in Nevada and the Pacific.75 By the late 1970s the issue finally
became the subject of hearings as veterans of Desert Rock testified before Congress.
Many such veterans believed their poor health and the health of their offspring had a
direct link to radiation exposure during the 1950s atomic battlefield maneuvers.76
Ever since the early 1960s the pentomic idea and the future war vision that drove it
has been sufficiently ridiculed by military and academic writers that the enthusiasm it
once commanded vanished from memory. To be sure, the army kept battlefield nuclear
weapons in the arsenal until the end of the Cold War. However, though NATO
continued to prepare for battlefield nuclear war, the U.S. armed forces prepared in the
main to fight nonnuclear battlefield wars or all-out thermonuclear war if deterrence
failed. This suggests that nuclear war fighting took on the same fatalist characteristics
that fiction writers had been speculating about. Nuclear war would be World War III
and would mean deterrence had failed. If deterrence failed, it would probably mean
Armageddon. This outlook is very different from the early nuclear age outlook that
brought us the pentomic army. It is an outlook that is very different from the idea that
a future nuclear war would be like World War II except that lieutenants, sergeants,
and corporals would have access to atomic-powered vehicles and atomic warheads.
In the early nuclear age, despite the tone of most literature, which depicted dire
consequences should future nuclear war be fought, military and civilian professionals
within the government and armed forces optimistically debated and discussed future
war with tactical battlefield nuclear weapons. Soon the United States constructed the
pentomic army. The Pentagon and advertisers for the military-industrial complex
and elements of popular culture all reflected an optimistic future for nuclear combat. These particular visions of future war from the early nuclear age have all but
vanished from our memory of that time. These visions reflected an important aspect
of the early nuclear age. Nuclear power and weapons appeared to be a great step forward in projecting power on the battlefield and were part of a larger dream that the
unlocking of the secrets of nuclear forces would transform the world for the better.
Now, nothing is left of those visions of future war except sickened veterans and the
establishment in 2000 of a National Day of Remembrance, July 16, honoring soldiers,
sailors, airman, and marines exposed to radiation in the line of duty.
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